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Claims to Authority 
Hege Skjeie 
Claims to Authority 1 
While the concept of power long has been central to feminist political theory, there have 
been relatively few analyses ofthe closely related concept of authority. When "authority" 
is taken up, it tends to serve as a key concept for understanding male dominance and female 
subordination. But often this has been confined to little more than a passing reference. 
More recent contributions indicate that the meanings and practices of authority are now in 
the process of gaining focus within feminist political theory. My own point of departure is 
a set of statements on gendered authority being formulated in two books by Anna 
Jonasdottir and Kathleen B. Jones respectively. In both, authority is discussed as a concept 
and a practice which privileges masculinity to the point of effectively preventing women 
from achieving; being in authority. Contrary to this, I will argue that even traditional 
notions of authority call provide room for women's authority - at conceptual and factual 
levels alike. Re-examining the familiar weberian ideal types, I try to show that although this 
room may as yet seem narrow, there are possibilities for expansion. Demonstrating this, I 
rely on examples from Norwegian party politics. From these experiences, however, I also 
argue that not all possible expansions would be equally wise to persue. 
Authority is a recurrent theme in Anna Jonasdottir's theory of "love power", presented 
in her doctoral thesis ("Love Power and Political Interests") and in the book titled Why 
Women are Oppressed (1994). Here Jonasdottir analyses mechanisms that are vital to the 
sexual authority structure prevaling in formally free and equal, contemporary societies 
(1994:xiii). The fact that our society is male-dominated in all areas does not mean that 
women have no influence at all; what we lack is authority - as women, Jonasdottir 
maintains. Whereas authority implies open acknowledgement, influence means effect, or 
power which is not always recognized as legitimate. We women do not always face 
A fIrst version of this article was published in Norwegian in Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift noJ, 
1993. 
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opposition when we want to increase our influence - especially not if we hide, as best we 
can, the fact that we are women. It is mainly when we demand authority - as women - that 
opposition arises, Jonasdottir states. 
In the book Compassionate Authority. Democracy and the Representation of Women 
(1993) Kathleen B. Jones wishes to consider the ways that specific constructions of 
masculinity and femininity figure in the elaboration of arguments about authority. 
According to her, our very understanding of authority involves a tendency to associate the 
authoritative - a forceful, commanding voice - with the masculine, whereas those forms 
of expression which we connect with the feminine tend to be de-coupled from our 
understanding of authority. There exists a conceptual split between authority, on the one 
side, and, on the other, compassion - and this serves to prevent women from achieving 
authority.' 
According to Jonasdottir, men's authority is related to how they maintain a self-evident 
worthiness, and a self-evident right to presence. Women, on the other hand, still have to 
justify participation on public arenas by means of utility arguments - i.e. reference to 
women's special, complementary, interests and experiences. As I understand Jonasdottir, 
authority for women "as women" would imply establishing a self evident presence, similar 
to that which now applies for men. Jones, however, is clearly seeking an alternative 
understanding of authority - one which would create space for precisely that which we see 
as feminine characteristics - more concretely, closeness and compassion. Yet they also 
meet in a common wish, on women's behalf, that a space be allowed "for emotive and 
compassionate judgments, so that the cognitive-rational choices will be kept within reason" 
(Jonasdottir 1994:269). 
I agree that this, carefully considered, is an important project to feminism. But I 
disagree with what I perceive to be two kinds of rather totalizing statements on a current 
gendered authority structure that this wish for the future builds upon. Partly, this 
disagreement has been formulated with reference to a set of empirical experiences with 
women actually claiming political authority - for themselves, and on behalf of women. In 
all the Scandinavian countries, women and men are in the process of sharing the positions 
of political power more evenly between themselves. In Norway, a decisive step was taken 
when in May 1986 the new social democratic Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
appointed the first "Women's Cabinet", as the media were soon to name it. Since then, no 
2 See also her article "On Authority: Or, Why Women are not Entitled to Speak" in J.R.Pennock and 
J.W.Chapman (1987). 
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Norwegian Cabinet has included less than 40 percent women. Portraits of various 
Scandinavian "Women in leadership" events have had a world wide distribution; this 
situation clearly differs from the solitary images which otherwise commonly are transmitted 
when women occupy top political posts. Here we are instead talking about situations where 
women have come to parttake on close to equal footing with men in both cabinet and 
parliament, in regional political bodies, and in the leadership of the national party 
organisations. In Norway a majority of political parties have adopted a set of regulations 
on the composition of political bodies; a system of gender quotas which in fact approaches 
a formal guarantee of equal participation rights. The quota regulations simply state that 
both sexes are to be represented by a minimum of 40 percent. In this kind of political 
context, "being a woman politician" is clearly in the process of demystification; by now this 
seems a far less strange and lonely practice. 
In the early 1990s I conducted a research project on women's participation in political 
leadership in Norway. In connection with this project I also interviewed all members of 
both the Norwegian Cabinet and Parliament. J Doing this kind of work, I came to question 
what is otherwise claimed to be common feminist recognition; i.e. "the overwelming 
masculine nature of symbolic justifications for and practices of authority that are central 
in maintaining gender inequality and women's subordination" (Acker 1995:467) Accepted 
at face value, this kind of "recognition" would imply that even when women participate at 
the very highest level in politics, they cannot be in politics with "as much" authority as men 
(cf. lonasdottir 1994). But thinking about authority in the concrete - as something of 
relevance to actual persons and positions - this kind of factual claim did not seem 
convincing. As far as I can see, women in the Scandinavian countries do participate in 
politics; speaking and deliberating; claiming authority; not only individually but also - in 
a collective sense - "as women". Yet how can such claims succeed, if the dominant 
understanding of authority tends to converge on "a form of masculinized mastery" - as for 
instance Kathleen Jones (1987,1993) maintains ? 
Admittedly, the Scandinavian experience is rather exeptional. Yet in my opinion, this 
particular case still has more general implications that ought to be considered in 
examinations of the meanings and practices of authority. To me, it thus became important 
to ask whether - and how - even our traditional understandings of authority might provide 
room for women achieving; being in; authority. Among such figures of thought, Max 
Weber's ideal types loom large indeed. Undoubtedly, Weber's position is - to put it mildly -
In this article, citations from Cabinet Members refer to these interviews. 
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subject to criticism within feminist critiques of "the classics". I still, however, would hold 
that these ideal types can provide a tool for discussing the possibilities which women have 
to establish and maintain political authority. Following Weber's distinction between legal, 
charismatic, and traditional forms of authority, I shall thus discuss implications of these 
distinctions for women's claims to authority.' 
Ideal types consider sources for authority - how such claims are based on different types 
oflegitimation. Much recent thought concerning authority, however, concentrates on the 
tension between authority and autonomy - and on the burdens and dangers accompanying 
any of authority's practices (c£ Sennett 1981 , or Conolly 1987). Similarly, feminist writing 
have also opted for political alternatives which alltogether reject authority. Such critiques 
are not discussed here. Instead, the focus in this article is on different traditional 
legitimation bases - on the general assumption that Weberian categories, in spite of 
critisism, remain a common inheritance - that they still influence our thinking about 
authority, whether we tend to accept or reject its different practises. 
The Weberian Heritage: Positional vs Personal Authority 
The heritage from Weber is apparent in our simultaneous association to both hierarchy and 
legitimacy. "If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both 
coercion by force and persuasion", as for example Hannah Arendt wrote in one of the most 
widely quoted essays on authority, "What Was Authority" (1958).5 Authority claims, and 
builds on, obedience. But this obedience is based on consent, and on confidence, trust, or 
loyalty. When one of these falters, authority is undermined: the "authority" becomes 
illegitimate, or false. Authority can, however, have different sources - it may be based on 
varying types of legitimation. 
The legal form of authority - which Weber terms "modem" and which we also 
characterize as "rational" and "bureaucratic" - is an impersonal, non-partisan form of 
My presentation of Weber builds on his "The Types of Legitimate Domination" in Economy and 
Society (1968) and "Politics as a Vocation"in From Max Weber (1958). 
The purpose of this article however was to show, through a historical philosophic analysis, what the 
original meaning of authority was, and how it "has vanished from the modem world" Thus the title; 
what was authority. 
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order.6 Obedience towards this fonn of authority is linked first and foremost to the order 
itself, and only secondarily to those in positions of authority. In other words, the legal 
authority concerns the authority that accompanies a position, rather than lodging in the 
individual person - and for the individual it remains valid only as long as that person 
remains in that position. The premises of legitimacy which are established by the legal fonn 
of authori ty are not limited - neither in principle nor in practice - to the administrative part 
of bureaucracy, but include also the top, political, level. We accept that the administrative 
head of a government ministry has authority simply by virtue of his or her position. 
Likewise, we accept that the political head of a government ministry has authority by virtue 
of his or her position. In the final instance, it is the Minister who is responsible for the 
decisions taken by the bureaucracy: and also the Minister is bound by regulations. J Legal 
authority is in principle gender-neutral. Once positions are occupied, authority is also 
transferred to those persons who occupy them, be they women or men. Thus when men 
renounce their monopoly on political leadership positions - as is for instance formalized 
through quota regulations - this simply means that they have also renounced their 
hegemony on political authority in this weberian fonnallegal sense. 
I have no difficulty in accepting that this kind of simple reminder is of limited interest 
to feminist concerns about male dominance and female subordination in relations of 
authority. Such concerns have mainly concentrated on whether this positionally-dependent 
authority only seemingly is gender neutral; whether its central characteristics actually 
contain a hidden masculine coding which works to women's disadvantage (cf. Jones 1993, 
chap. 3). Within bureaucracies, "tecnical competence" is the central principle of 
recruitment. The legal fonn of authority does not accept any kind of traditionally-based 
transfer - or usurpation - of positions. Weber saw the legal form of authority to have a clear 
status-equalizing and equality-creating function, also within the bureaucracy itself - a 
tendency which mainly follows in the wake of the demand for "competence" as the basis 
To repeat a well-known maxim: legal authority is characterized first of all by having a clearly limited 
sphere of validity. It is bound by rules; it is organized in the form of a hierarchy with the right of 
appeal; it demands neutrality and independence, written communication and specialized knowledge. 
In terms of ideal types, Weber's distinction between legal and charismatic authority may be read also 
as a distinction beteen the "bureaucratic" and the "political". Yet his own discription of the legal 
authority also includes the political level: "An elected president, a cabinet of ministers, or a body 0 f 
elected "People's representatives" also in this sense constitute administrative organs" (Economy and 
Society p.2IS) 
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for recrui tmen!. 8 Yet this adherence to competence has also been claimed to contain such 
a strong, if hidden, masculine coding that we ought to question its legitimacy (cf. Stivers 
1994). 
There is little doubt that the premises established by the legal form of authority, 
including its demand for competence, also influence the way in which we think about 
political leadership more generally. I would not, however, agree that the premise of 
neutrality that goes with the demand for competence, necessarily disadvantages women. 
When we for instance demand greater influence for women within the political leadership 
by referring to "resources of political competence" - then we are drawing heavily on the 
legitimacy base of the legal form of authority. We are implying that gender-skewed 
recruitment is due to other - and consequently irrelevant - methods of recruitment. Within 
this framework it clearly makes no sense for women to claim authority "as women" other 
than through insisting on the principle of "equal treatment". That is: in the competition for 
those positions which grant authority, qualifications are what count. Adherence to 
"neutrality" is not necessarily naive. It does not necessarily mean that we believe that 
"political competence" exists as a non negotiable, fixed and specified, set of qualifications. 
Nor does it imply a beliefthat competence in practice is evaluated irrespective of gender. 
We are only stating what the norm is, and that the norm should not be disregarded. 
The actual relevance of "competence" for political authority becomes clear also when 
we consider statements from top politicians on their own political careers. When for 
instance the members of the first "Women's Cabinet" - in positions of authority from 1986 
to 1989 - were asked what they thought were the most important reasons for their own 
appointment to ministerial posts, the one prominent qualification turned out to be "political 
competence". References were either made to general experience from parliamentary 
decision-making processes, or to specific expertise in those policy areas they were now in 
charge of. Thus confidence in their own specialist knowledge - in the workings and/or the 
priorities of politics - was what primarily marked the "self evaluation" of men and women 
alike. 
As one Cabinet Minister pointed out: 
Economy and Society, pp. 225- 226. Discussions of authority after Weber has often stressed drawing 
a distinction between authority based on competence and authority based on position: the distinction 
between being "an authority" and being "in authority". See e.g. Ball 1987. In Weberian bureaucracy, 
however, being Ilan authority" and being "in authority" go hand in hand. 
It's important to recognize that "politics" constitutes its own field of competence. 
Being in charge of a Ministry, you clearly benefit from familiarity with the 
workings of Parliament. This is not something you learn from reading books. You 
need to know this particular workplace. 
11 
In Norwegian politics, the party system largely remains too strong to allow too much 
dominance by single leaders. Nevertheless, in the interview series there were Cabinet 
Ministers who also stressed the importantance of "personalities" - of personality traits like 
determination and independence; creativity and ideas; ability to inspire; involvement with 
and care for people. More generally, political authority is, of course, not merely a question 
of the authority that accompanies a position. Rather, positions can be said to provide a 
minimum of authority which is necessary to exercise influence. Accepting the authority 
conferred by positions does not mean that we do not care about the personal qualities of 
those who occupy the positions - quite the reverse. From our politicians we expect more 
than factual knowledge and competence. They must follow the rules, and with integrity 
- but that is far from being enough. We want ideas and visions, we want enthusiasm and 
engagement. And in placing such demands, we have moved far beyond the framework of 
the legal form of authority. It has now become a question of Weber's second ideal type: 
charismatic authority. This is a personally, not a positionally, based form of authority. In 
focus now are the unique personalities - those who by virtue of their special qualities can 
convince others of the need to rally round them. Charismatic authorities are those who at 
any given time bring promises of change; they are the ones who challenge inflexible 
structures and routinized relations. 
Charismatic Authority and Promises of Change 
Weber's ideal types indicate classifications, but this is not to say that the categories must 
be seen as mutually exclusive. Rather, the point is - as Weber notes - "to distinguish what 
aspects can be identified as falling under or approximating one or another of the categories" 
(Weber 1968:263). 9 In the same way, charismatic authority in its ideal-type form concerns 
the one leader and his, or her, enthusiastic supporters. In practice, however, we will look 
for charismatic traits in more than just one uncontested leader. Weber himself was sceptical 
Cf. also Richard E. Flathman: "If the distinctions are important it is presumably because authority 
works somewhat differently, enters into social and political life in somewhat different ways, depends 
upon somewhat different conditions, in each ofthe major types that Weber distinguishes. And Weber's 
discussion is indeed an anempt to show that this is the case." (Flathman 1973: 1 00) 
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to the "formalistic impersonality" of the legal form of authority - which knows neither hate 
nor passion, but thereby neither involvement nor enthusiasm. It risks becoming authority 
without substance or goals. Also in modem authority relations we need charismatic leaders. 
Bureaucracy needs a political leadership capable of formulating goals and creating 
enthusiasm; a leadership that can show dedication to a cause; a leadership that has personal 
authority and that can take personal responsibility. But this has to be leaders who at the 
same time are bound by the competing prerequisites of the positions they occupy; 
predictability and neutrality. All of us fear the Janus-visage of charisma: the leader who 
misleads us, the hero who turns despotic. When we think of political authority, then, we are 
thinking about both position and personality. 
Charismatic authority has two important characteristics. First, it is directed towards 
change and renewal. It first appears as an oppositional authority in the sense of stressing 
" other" goals than those "now" in focus . At the same time, charisma is also a collective 
term for personal radiance and attraction. Seen in this light, such authority has an open 
form, one which is filled by means of the personal qualities possessed by a charismatic 
leader. Charismatic authority is far from being gender-neutral in the same way as the legal 
form of authority is: it cannot at one and the same time focus on the person yet ignore 
gender. The legitimacy that follows from the legal form of authority is one that has to be 
"without regard to gender". Within charismatic relations of authority however, it can be 
argued that a space does exist outside the formal considerations for women's claims to 
authority "as women".'o 
This space is provided by the very orientation towards change and renewal in 
c harismatic relations of authority. After all, it is the mental category of "women" that 
r epresents something new - not all those individuals belonging to the category of "men" 
"'Who, for centuries, have marched into positions - and out of them again. Political processes 
rnight thus develop where individual women come to benefit from the change and renewal 
that "women" - in this collective sense - are claimed to promise. Consider for instance the 
following statement from one ofthe ministers in the first Norwegian "Women's Cabinet": 
10 I use this pbrazing; "as women" in the same deliberately vague sense as for instance Anna lonasdottir 
(1994) - cf. also Astrem and Hirdman 1992. With regard to the discussions carried out in this article, 
I 'hink that there really is no need to go into the overwelming Iitterature on feminist disputes over 
essentialism; over the "real existence" of common attributes; common interests; or common identity. 
I still syrnphetize with Iris Young's claim for tla more pragmatic orientation tl , that is for an intellectual 
discourse where categorizing, explaining, developing accounts and arguments are tied to specific 
prac tical and political problems (Young 1994). 
Obviously, being a woman is itself important - I joined politics largely due to this. 
I also think that the group of women who became members of Parliament in 1977 
- there are five of us in the Cabinet now - received much positive attention. We got 
better opportunities than the men in our "class"; we were encouraged and put in 
charge of big political issues. 
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The most prominent of this Minister's "class mates" is undoubtedly the former Norwegian 
Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland. She first took over as head of the Norwegian 
government in 1981, at a time when the then existing Labour Party leadership had 
exhausted its capacity through a series of internal status disputes. The advocates of Ms. 
Brundtland's leadership candidacy came close to portraying her as the party's only possible 
saviour: only she could represent a clear alternative to all those male veterans ofthe internal 
party wars . The popular daily paper Dagbladet followed the new Prime Minister on her 
first tour. In the coastal town ofPorsgrunn, so many people assembled that at least 200 had 
to be turned away from the meeting room. And the journalist reported back to Oslo: 
I have been at many an election meeting in the Labour Party. Never have I seen 
anything like what happened yesterday. Those resigned, grey faces who for so long 
have dominated Labour gatherings have now taken on colour. Eyes were bright with 
eagerness. A kind of kowtowing, almost. A bit scary - the way it often is at revival 
meetings." (Hansson and Teigene 1992:124) 
Yet in charismatic relations of authority, "women" may mean more than new faces ; new 
voices. Their appeal might also be linked to the presentation of "new ideas" and "new 
goals" for political activity. During the past two decades, Norwegian politics has witnessed 
the gradual breaktrough for what I call a political rethoric of difference. This means that 
demands for women's integration into party politics have been supported by a line of 
arguments which primarily have maintained the following credo: "Gender consitutes an 
important political category, which need to be fully represented. Regardless of partisan 
preferences, women have a right to be represented by their own; that is by women. Actual 
representation is necessary: men cannot negotiate the values, experiences, or interests, of 
women" . Regardless of actual program statements, or policy specifications, a collective 
promise has thus been attached to demands for women's political integration. While 
individual party women clearly have demanded fair treatment for themselves in the 
competition for political positions - in line with those premises which the legal form of 
authority establish - they have at the same time contributed to underscore a promise of 
political change following from their interests, experiences, or perspectives, as women. 
When present in sufficient numbers - this promise states - women politicians will broaden 
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the scope of political decision making, adding new issues and new values to the political 
agenda. They might even bring about a whole new set of political priorities. The new 
agendas, and the new choices, will in tum help create a more "woman-friendly society". II 
Also writing from within a Scandinavian political context, Anna 10nasdottir has 
nevertheless claimed that appeals to "new priorities" cannot provide (sufficient) room for 
women's authority "as women". In this, she stresses a distinction between men's obvious 
right to participation, and the lack of such a right for women. The distinction she makes 
applies to men as a group, and to women as a group. But it also follows the individual, 
acting as a framework that defines the individual's chances of establishing personal 
authority. For Jonasdottir, it is a major problem that women still have tojustify presence 
by means of utility arguments - that is by references to women's "special" resources and 
experiences. Even when present in equal numbers, women this way remain "the other". And 
this way, the proofwill still rest with women. Ifwe women cannot show that we do indeed 
represent something different from what men stand for, then the conclusion may easily 
become that there is no point in our presence. 
This is a warning worth listing to. In my opinion, "utility" might well be the single most 
powerful discursive trap in liberal deliberations on representation. Yet I still think that 
10nasdottir somewhat overstates the problem of utility. Firstly, arguments on the political 
relevance of gender have not been made solely in terms of utility. In actual political 
contexts, they have rather been stated in two distinctly different ways. Adressing a cross 
party audience, they have been frazed either in terms of "resources", or in terms of 
"interests". Only the "resource" argument; that women's experiences will represent a 
valuable contribution to decision making prosesses, can be said to bear some resemblance 
to lonasdottir's utility argument. The "interest" argument, however, has primarily 
maintained that the conflicting interests of men and women require a balanced 
representation of both parties. In strategic terms, the former aimed to convince more 
conservative audiences, while the latter mainly aimed to convince more radical political 
audiences (Hemes 1982, Skjeie 1991). 
Secondly, but as important: 10nasdottir's claim Ignores that justifications actually is 
something we ask of all political activity that involves leadership. The personal form of 
authority - as described e.g. by Weber as charismatic - is in general concerned with 
justifications. It is oriented towards change and renewal - and must present itself through 
" This phrase was coined by the Norwegian political scientist, Helga Hemes (1987); herself a Deputy 
Minister in The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late 1980's and early 1990's. cr. also Jones (1990.) 
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statements on new goals and new ideas. It is exactly through the presentation of alternatives 
that new authority creates its own space. True enough, the reasons provided by men are 
rarely stated with reference to gender. Only women's political participation has been argued 
in terms of collective justifications that refers directly to gender. But in collectivity, women 
are newcomers to positions of leadership. By presenting themselves in terms of "the 
alternative", they have thus made use of a well-known political strategy. Collective 
justifications are general attempts to enlarge the room for legitimate authority, and can thus 
be seen a central way of expressing women's claims to authority "as women". In this 
respect, they simultaniously offer both tools, and traps. 
For the individual, a collective justification will clearly not be the only one provided for 
a personal claim to authority. Individuals must still demonstrate those personal qualities 
which will create enthusiasm, and rally support. Yet the credibility of the collective 
justifications also depend on individuals choosing to embrace them as their own, followed 
up by different kinds of specifications. Once again, the former Norwegian Prime Minister 
Gro Harlem Brundtland might provide an example to illustrate this. From the outset of her 
political career, she received strong support from the Labour Party's women's organization. 
In the early 1970's she had worked with them to secure legal abortion rights. She also 
supported the demand for an internal quota system for party offices, and explicitly referred 
to this quota policy as an important guide to her selection of cabinet ministers. With the 
women's organisation, she continued to give high priority to political measures aimed to 
further women's economic independence. Through the 1970s and the 1980s, the most 
important of such measures came to include, on the one hand an equal rights legislation for 
education and employment, on the other hand an extention of the publicly funded day care 
service and paid parental leave reforms. In an effort to "bring the father back to the family", 
leave regulations were also introduced where the child's father must take a fixed minimum 
leave for the family to uphold rights to the full leave period. 
These latter policies have mainly been advocated as "A Politics of Care". This phrazing 
is intended to signal the equal relevance of such policies to women and men; mothers and 
fathers; parents and children. But at the same time they are uniformly regarded both as 
caused by and promoted through women's political leadership. More vaguely, the new 
political focus within the Labour Party leadership was commented by one Cabinet member 
as follows : 
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Just take the title of the new Labour programme - "We need one another" - that 
hasn't emerged from any traditional male circle. The bosses in the LO (Federation 
of Trade Unions) - and mind you, I hold nothing against them - they're not the ones 
behind that particular slogan. 
"The new" will, however, soon be embraced by processes of routinization. We grow 
accustomed to annual announcements of longer parental leave, and stop fretting about a 
lack of kindergartens. On the other hand, this merely illustrates Weber's point: charismatic 
authority is always an ephemeral phenomenon. As soon as it becomes established and 
routinized, that paves the way for a new oppositional authority. After nearly a decade as 
Norwegian Prime Minister, Ms. Brundtland was regularly confronted by her opponents 
with an accusation that she appeared, and behaved, like a Chief Executive - or Corporate 
Director - of politics. Such a title is not particularly honourable for someone in a position 
o f top political leadership. It indicates a politician with only the legal form of authority as 
backup; it signals either lack of charisma, or the routinization of charismatic authority 
- mainly in the direction of increased bureaucratization. 
Yet in spite of these kinds of "routinization", the general impact of a rhetoric of 
difference remains. A series of studies demonstrate how Norwegian party leaderships 
largely share the credo ofthe political relevance of gender. Men and women alike maintain 
that there are differences in the interests, or values, held by men and women politicians. 
And new women candidates for top leadership positions in tum present new interpretations, 
and specifications, of what might constitute women friendly policies. 
Authority and Masculinity 
Relying on examples from Norwegian party politics, I have so far tried to demonstrate how 
women's claims to authority might find support within the frameworks of either the legal 
or the charismatic form of authority described by Weber. Doing this, I have also touched 
upon a m:ljor aspect offeminist critisism against Weber's work. Much of this criticism has 
been directed towards the value Weber is claimed to attach to what we perceive as 
masculine qualities. In other words, this is now a matter of the consequences of gender 
polarizing - of dualistic associations linked to what is masculine and what is feminine 12 -
12 These dualisms we know very well indeed - the list could be extended almost indefinitely. In one 
familiar quote: "We thus construct rationality in opposition to emotionality, objectivity in opposition 
to subjectivity. culture in opposition to nature, the public realm in opposition to the private realm. 
Whether we read Kant, Rousseau, Hegel or Darwin, we find that female and male are contrasted in 
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and the need to reveal the hidden masculine structures in Weber's writings. Both the legal 
and the charismatic form of authority are held to contain representations that privileges 
masculinity. In her chapter on "Gender and the Marks of Authority" Kathleen Jones (1993) 
argues that rational legal systems only appearently establish authority in gender neutral 
terms. Following Wendy Brown (1988), she maintains that authority understood as 
instrumental rationality is a masculinized practice: regardless of sex, bureaucratic leaders 
are "masculinized" because they are above the merely SUbjective pull of everyday life, 
while their followers are "feminized" because they are subjected to the soulless commands 
of rationalized, instrumentalized and institutionalized "manliness" (Jones 1993:111).13 
While acknowledging that charismatic authority may be more capable of accomodating 
marks of "the feminine" as indicators of authority, Kathleen Jones nevertheless concludes 
that "Weber's list of those characteristics thought to be charismatic seems more indebted 
to masculine representations for greatness than feminine ones" (Jones 1993:112).14 
She then moves on to enquire after an alternative understanding of authority, one that 
can create room for precisely that which we see as feminine qualities. Jones calls this 
"compassionate authority" - an understanding of authority which is capable of elevating 
the role of empathy. To continue in terms of dichotomies, such a concept of authority 
would involve communication more than command, closeness more than distance. [t 
implies, according to Jones, a more humane, but also more ambiguous, authority: it is 
concerned with interpretation and meaning more than with order through rules. 
She is fully aware that investigations into the "hidden masculinity", run the risk of 
reinforcing gender stereotypes. Criticizing Weber for his "masculine thinking" however 
adds another well known problem, that the critics thereby risk appearing as more 
pronounced representatives of a gender-dichotomous line of thought than Weber himself. 
" 
14 
tenns of opposing characters: women love beauty, men truth; women are pass ive, men active; women 
are emotional, men rational; women are selfless, men selfish - and so on and on through the history of 
western philosophy. (Harding 1986: 123). 
A sinti lar claim is, as already noted, made by Stivers (1994), who maintains that defending legitimacy 
on the basis of "competence" is problematic because the image of the public administrator thus 
conceived privileges masculine characteristics while denigrating and/or supressing feminine ones. 
In this I think she makes an interpretation similar to for instance Roslyn W. Bologh: "I call Weber's 
conception of charismatic leadership "patriarchal", because it means taking charge and ruling or 
conunanding .. as opposed to leadership that is more maternal in principle - either by an exemplary 
type, leading by example or suggestion, or of a representative type, leading by representing or carrying 
out the wishes of those whom one represents , or of a pedagogical type, leading by teaching and learning 
from (being responsive to) those whom one teaches." (8010gh 1990:94) 
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15 In the feminist case made against the legal fonn of authority, gender stereotypes might 
be established were none fonnerly existed. As already argued, in this case I think the wiser 
approach would be to keep the ground as neutral as possible - if still soulless. I do, 
however, agree that the charismatic fonn of authority provides little gender neutral ground. 
This is due to the simple fact that being a personal fonn of authority it cannot at the same 
time ignore gender. What it does provide, however, is an openness towards different "gifts 
of grace". To the degree that we choose to focus on dichotomies of masculinity and 
femininity, we might also choose to look not only for "marks of the masculine" . The more 
we look, the more we might discover both to be potentially, or actually, present. 
Consider for instance the range of practical political attempts which aim to create 
legitimacy for women's authority exactly by focusing on "feminine qualities" . In the 
literature on management and leadership there are now an abundance of descriptions of two 
distinct sets of expectations linked to masculine and to feminine leadership respectively. 
The masculine leadership ideal portrayed is the strategic-rational: the feminine ideal is the 
relational. This relational ideal emphasizes precisely such things as communication and 
dialogue. Nor should we forget that, in the world of politics, this is a leadership ideal which 
has long been relevant, if not always as clearly focused. The very tension within 
representation theory has to do with the balance that must be struck between the will to lead 
and the will to listen, between political initiatives and political obligations. The "new" and 
"feminine" leadership ideal thus attaches itselfto an old vision of change and development 
through dialogue. 
Once again we meet a kind of collective justification. The "feminine alternative", 
however, adresses broad leadership styles more than general leadership priorities. As of 
today we meet such justifications in very different contexts. The core is similar, but the 
specification may vary according to context. To illustrate this, I will present one example 
from another arena than the party-political, and quote Rosemarie K0hn, the first woman 
appointed bishop in the Norwegian Church, as she told about a study she had carried out 
about clergy roles: "The men appeared as "priests of the pulpit". They stressed their 
importance as teachers in the parish. The women appeared as "priests of the street". They 
saw themselves as fellow wanderers, and were more concerned with being close to people. 
They were more relational-, or process-oriented. They saw this as a part of preaching. This 
15 Concerning this as a more general point, see also Harding 1986, p. 130. 
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was an unexpected observation for us who worked on this study. Male and female clergy 
have two different ways of being in authority. I think we need both in the Norwegian 
Church." 16 
Again we thus meet justifications that seeks to expand the general room for legitimate 
authority. These attempts to broaden our notions of authority are surely not made without 
risk. They imply that we must live with the constant danger involved in stereotyping 
- which actually means that the individual may become not only linked to but instead glued 
into the group stereotype. I will give one example of how this might happen. In May 198&, 
the "Women's Cabinet" celebrated its second anniversary, and the newspaper Dagbladet 
participated in the press conference held at Hotel Bristol in Oslo. The women cabinet 
members had on this occasion planned to inform of new national policies of benefit to 
women. But Dagbladet chose to focus on fonn rather than on content. And when form was 
to be evaluated, hardly anyone passed the test. The cabinet ministers communicated "the 
way politicians do, not the way women do". There was no warmth; no closeness. Instead, 
the women withdrew - they created distance. What seemed in particular to have annoyed 
the journalist present, was that the women were so busy. After having delivered their 
message, they simply hurried away. In some detail she described a "meeting" between a 
young colleague and the minister responsible for equal opportunity affairs. Ahead ran the 
minister, followed by the journalist - who carried an information folder on women and 
leadership, provided by the Ministry. All the way the minister shouted - like the rabbit in 
"Alice in Wonderland" - that she did not have time, her schedule was much to busy. Just 
like clever little men in suits - the newspaper stated in big headlines the following morning. 
What we here witnessed was the boomerang effect of "femininity". Here the collective 
justification hit women in collectivity: the women's behaviour broke with the expectations 
as to how women WOUld, and should, behave. In this case, the glue of "femininity" showed 
itself to be one which easily stuck. And when this happened, the space for individual 
expressions more or less disappeared. I think that collective justifications which build on 
notions of femininity are bound to create more dangerous discursive traps than collective 
justifications which builds on notions of interests or experiences. The fonner draw far more 
heavily on dualistic preconceptions, and thus provide less room for individual 
specifications than the latter. This also means that the trap of "promises unkept" closes 
more easily. 
16 Ukt og ulikt, The Equal Status Council's quarterly magazine, m. 10, 1993. 
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Claims to authority based on "the feminine alternative" can thus at best be made on very 
shaky grounds. I am not sure, however, that claims based on opposite notions - of 
masculinity - are made from much more solid ground. Hopefully, this can be illustrated 
through an examination of Weber's third ideal type, traditional authority. Within this 
framework, we primarily meet images of masculinity contained within the figure of "the 
father", 
Paternal Authority, and its Maternal Counterpart 
The traditional fonn of authority as described by Weber is based on inherited privileges and 
posi tions. Obedience is, however, due to the persons who uphold this heritage - and in this 
sense, traditional authority also concerns personal authority. But traditional authority gives 
direct associations to the relations in the old, patriarchal family - that is, associations of 
omnipotent fathers and powerless mothers and children. 17 The legitimacy of a patriarchal 
form of authority is dependent on whether we can and will accept a male dominance 
founded in traditions and maintained through inheritance - albeit not necessarily literally -
of privileges and positions. In modernity, as Weber observed, this fonn of authority is 
clearly a vanishing one. Yet justifications of gender hierarchies by reference to tradition 
still get approval in lots of settings. And the disputes that arised over the appointment of 
Rosemarie Kahn to the office of bishop also demonstrated how the church's tradition of 
male dominance was by some regarded as a forceful argument in its own right. But within 
the sphere ofliberally based party politics such justifications are clearly not legitimate ones; 
here it would be impossible to maintain "tradition" as a valid reason for male dominance. 
On the other hand, the old patriarchal [ann of authority also has a modern variant. In 
his Authority (1981), Richard Sennett describes this variant as a paternalistic authority - a 
father-like authority. This then is a form of authority which legitimizes itself not so much 
by means of direct reference to tradition, inherited rights and privileges. Rather it plays on 
the traditional role ofthe father, his promise of security and protection and on our own need 
17 Weber described two main variants of traditional authority: the patriarchal and the patrimonial. "I. 
Patriarchalism is the situation where, within a group (household) which is usually organized on both 
an economic and a kinship basis, a particular individual governs who is designated by a definite rule 
of inheritance ... the patriarch's authority carries a strict obligations to obedience only within his own 
household. '_ II. Patrimonialism ... tend(s) to arise whenever traditional domination develops an 
administration and a military force which are purely personal insnuments of the master. By controlling 
these instruments the ruler can broaden the range of his arbitrary power and put himself in a position 
to grant grace and favours at the expense of the traditional limitations of patriarchal structures ." 
(Economy and Society, pp. 231- 233) 
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for care. Still the paternalistic authority also implies the existence of an alternative. The 
Founding Fathers present one well-known image of father-like political authority. And the 
female counterpart is obviously the Mother of the Nation. 
Even within the functionally divided family, Mother appears as a figure far less 
deprived of power than in the old patriarchal family, where the law proscribed her 
subordination. Within the framework of family-like relations, transferred to public arenas, 
the counterpart to paternalistic authority is thus the maternalistic, mother-like, authority. 
In some public settings this image of the mother-like authority is already well established . 
In pedagogy for instance, we often find descriptions of this kind of authority being at the 
very base of modem education principles (cf. Dale 1986, also Bologh 1990). True, the 
image of paternalistic authority is not only that of one who is pledged to protect. More than 
the maternalistic authority, the paternalistic one will still seem something distant, 
something elevated - or perhaps someone sitting in judgement (cf. Sennett 1981, also 
Holter 1991). But through the emphasis on protection and care, there is still a conceptual 
link between authority and compassion. Thus, when Kathleen Jones argues that we need 
an alternative understanding of authority which is capable of elevating the role of emphaty, 
we might counter that through both the "father" and the "mother" figure, care metaphors 
are already represented. 
Within the context of Norwegian politics, such metaphors have surely abounded. The 
public image of the Prime Minister as "Gro" is also one of "Mother Norway". To quote 
Dagbladet again: "well, she may at times talk like a White Paper, but she also has this way 
of making close contact, even if she hides it in the rush and bustle of the capital city. But 
get her far off on an island, or deep in the fjord country .. she then opens up and creates 
contact and warmth". In this - the newspaper claimed - she surely resembles her 
predecessor: the Norwegian "Father of the Nation" - Labour Party leader Einar Gerhardsen, 
who had remained Prime Minister for a period of nearly twenty years. 18 
The ideal image of maternalistic authority is the true sense of caring and being close. 
But we should also bear in mind that the reverse side of the coin is always lurking there . 
Both paternalistic and maternalistic authority draw heavily on metaphors. They carry the 
relationships of families into politics. Politics however requires grown-ups. And the images 
of parenti child-like relations that these metaphors convey, are clearly ambigous ones. They 
accentuate the question of true vs. false authority, which to both Sennett and Jones is indeed 
I' Steinar Hansson and Ingolf Hakon Teigene in Dagbladet, 31 Dec 1988. 
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a central one. Sennett ends up rejecting paternalism as an authority of "false love", claiming 
that his cases show us leaders who care for others only as long as it serves their own 
interests. 
Powerful mothers can be as frightening (cf. Ruddick 1980) - and opposition to a 
maternalistic form of authority may assume indeed extreme forms. I shall conclude with 
one last example, which is based on a book review of Robert Bly's Iron John. In this 
review, the Norwegian sociologist 0ystein Gullvag Holter read the book not only as a 
mythological description of male longing for a truly paternalistic authority - a father-figure 
who can lead his young sons in the hunt for genuine malehood. He also read it as a defence 
ofmale dominance: the core of "masculinity" portrayed by Bly was stealth, harshness and 
agression. Holter's points were taken up and debated by another sociologist, Tord H0ivik, 
who described Bly's book, and at the same time the public "mother-power" as follows: 
"(The book) is about going into a field that has been repressed, condemned, abandoned. It's 
all about leaving the field of women and feminist values as to how good boys ought to be. 
Boys today are growing up in a world of women - neat and tidy, prig and considerate .. 
Children end up in the soft, frustrated arms of caringness - first with full-time moms, and 
then in well-manicured kindergartens . Oh, such good boys we were! - Women trained us 
to be lap-dogs - and that at a time in life when we have to submit or die. And we hated it."!9 
Authority and Autonomy - a Constant Ambiguity 
What concerned Max Weber first and foremost were the different legitimacy sources of 
authority. Less important for him was the factual issue of consent. By contrast, much recent 
thought concerning authority takes as its point of departure the ambiguities, the 
ambivalences, in the tension between authority and autonomy. In Sennett's description, we 
tear authority, yet we search for it. We see authority as a threat to our freedom and fear its 
authoritarian face . But at the same time we ask for the guidelines or the security that 
authority has to offer. And that is why we continue to search for "true" authority all the 
vvhile strongly doubting that it exists . 
This ambivalence between authority and autonomy also finds expression in the dual 
demands we place on elected leaders. On the one hand, we expect them to show the will 
te lead and the power to act, and to take independent initiatives. But on the other hand, we 
19 Quoted in Mannsforskning, no. 2,1992. 
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also expect them to be attentive and to listen, disseminating that which is our will, while 
they furthennore - to some extent at least - leave us in peace. And often we demand all of 
this at the same time. We need to tie authority to fixed sets of regulations. But we also want 
to break away from the established. The ambivalence between fear of authority and the 
search for it creates a constant tension between assuredness and doubt. In the midst of 
enthusiasm, we are sceptical: our doubts grow as we wait for things to be taken care of For 
the kind of authority that builds on images of "father" and "mother", the ambivalence can 
become urgent indeed. The need to be cared for encounters the fear of becoming dependent: 
the fear of totality in a relation which, in its family-likeness, lacks boundaries. 
In this article, I have questioned "the overwelming masculine nature of symbolic 
justifications for and practices of authority" (Acker 1995). Instead, I have tried to show how 
women who seek political authority can find support in different aspects of our complex 
notions as to what authority is. I have argued against the claim that strategies which aim to 
build collective justifications for women's precense actually prevents us from achieving 
authority. This claim neglects that justifications are something we ask of all political 
leadership; that new authority creates its own space exactly through the presentation of 
alternatives; that collective justifications are general attempts to enlarge the room for 
legitimate authority. I strongly doubt, hovewever, that all such strategies are equally wise 
to persue. They all contain traps, but some traps seem more dangerous than others. 
Collective justifications which draw heavily on dualistic preconceptions in particular risk 
a boomerang effect, when collective "promises unkept" hit women collectedly. 
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